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The many cue types that animals are able to use for both long- and short-scale navigation have 
been studied extensively, and a well-researched literature has developed into the strategies that 
have evolved to exploit information provided by these different cues. Less well understood are 
questions of how animals select different cues to learn about, and the conditions for learning based 
on these cues. These queries have tended to concern psychologists interested in the extent to which 
the principles of associative learning apply to spatial learning. The question is of interest because 
the predictions of associative learning theories are often at odds with spatial learning theories, 
which instead tend to emphasize the special types of representation and learning process necessary 
for navigation. Here I examine spatial learning from an associative perspective, starting with the 
question of what kinds of associations are formed in associative learning and how these may fit within 
our knowledge of spatial learning. I then examine the conditions of learning, including the effects 
of prior experience on spatial learning in terms of both latent inhibition and perceptual learning, 
changes to the attention paid to spatial stimuli as a result of their predictive history, and the extent 
to which redundancy — when multiple cues predict same outcome — affects learning. The effects 
are illustrated mostly with examples from the associative learning literature, which is often with 
rodents or pigeons. But where possible, I have demonstrated similar effects in more diverse species 
and have tried to indicate the general learning effects that associative learning theories predict. 
Keywords: spatial learning, associative learning, cue competition, cognitive map, geometry
Introduction
The histories of the study of associative learning and 
spatial learning are intrinsically linked. The purpose of 
this article is to review the contents and conditions of 
spatial learning from an associative learning perspec-
tive. The rat’s natural proclivity for short-scale naviga-
tion and the ease with which it could be housed in the 
laboratory made it an ideal experimental subject in the 
early 20th century. The objective of much of this early 
comparative work was to determine what was actually 
learned during learning, and spatial problem solving 
seemed an ideal paradigm for answering such a question. 
Observations of the rat’s navigation to a rewarded loca-
tion through interconnected alleys led early research-
ers to the conclusion that learning was the result of trial 
and error (e.g., Small, 1901). In particular, the author of 
the behaviorist manifesto, John B. Watson, concluded 
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from the results of various navigation experiments that 
such trial-and-error learning was driven by kinaesthesia, 
with little input from sensing the external environment 
(Carr & Watson, 1908; Watson, 1907). Such conclusions 
drove stimulus-response (S-R) theory as a fait accompli 
for explaining learned behavior.
Later observations, most famously from Tolman’s 
laboratory, showed that rats did learn to navigate to a 
goal using external cues, which Watson (1907) had also 
observed but had downplayed. For example, Tolman, 
Ritchie, and Kalish (1946) trained rats in a T-maze to 
move to where food was located at one of the two goal 
arms, always starting the trial at a fixed point in the 
start arm. At the end of training, rats received a probe 
in which the entire maze was rotated 180° so that they 
started from the opposite location to the start position 
during training. The rats could either follow the response 
made during training (e.g., turn right at the choice point) 
or go to the location in the room where the food was 
placed during training (e.g., the west side of the room). 
These “response” and “place” strategies would lead the 
rats to opposite locations in the T-maze. The results 
showed that rats were capable of learning both strate-
gies. Although proponents of S-R theory argued that 
the use of such external cues was not inconsistent with 
S-R theory, albeit with a reduced emphasis on kinaes-
thesia (e.g., Restle, 1957), it has been suggested that S-R 
theory fails to acknowledge the flexibility (e.g., Blodgett, 
1929; Tolman & Honzik, 1930) and apparent ease (e.g., 
Tolman et al., 1946) with which learning based on such 
environmental cues takes place, which seemed to indi-
cate that animals had an expectation of the outcomes 
of their behavior — something that S-R theory did not 
include. This behaviorist/cognitivist distinction led to 
two dual-process accounts of learning — one that contin-
ued to explore spatial learning and led, most famously, 
to cognitive map theories (e.g., O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978; 
Tolman, 1948), and a second that removed the animal 
from the maze and placed it into an automated condi-
tioning chamber to investigate instrumental conditioning 
(e.g., Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). The former account 
has tended to emphasize shortcomings in associative 
learning theory in explaining flexible spatial learning, 
whereas the latter account has developed and enhanced 
our understanding of associative learning.
Part of the reason for the development of spatial 
learning theories that do not include the role of associa-
tive processes may be due to the erroneous conflation of 
associative learning theory with behaviorism (Rescorla, 
1988). Another part may be due to psychological accounts 
of spatial learning that have arisen from the observa-
tion of the behavioral correlates of single neurons in the 
rodent brain (review in Poulter, Hartley, & Lever, 2019). 
The purpose of this article is to review the contents and 
conditions of spatial learning from an associative learn-
ing perspective. I first analyze what is learned in spatial 
learning and how it relates to modern analyses of asso-
ciative learning, with particular reference to the simi-
larities between the different dual-process theories just 
mentioned. In this case, I review the associative struc-
tures that could be at play. I try to determine whether 
complex representations of space can be accounted for 
by these associative structures, or whether it is neces-
sary to invoke the notion of a cognitive map, as much 
of the neuroscientific and behavioral literature suggests. 
It may be that associative structures fall short of being 
able to explain the most complex spatial behaviors in 
animals. I then assess the conditions under which spatial 
learning progresses. Here, cognitive map theory often 
makes quite different predictions to associative learn-
ing theory, but I argue that these accounts have tended 
to overlook phenomena that are predicted only by asso-
ciative theories. For example, studies of how exposure to 
stimuli affects subsequent learning, or how redundancy 
of spatial information affects learning, strongly indicate 
a role for associative processes and are not accounted for 
in purely spatial accounts. The  challenges for research-
ers of spatial learning in incorporating evidence both for 
and against the role of associative learning in navigation 
are set out at the end of the article.
Cognitive Maps and S-R Learning
O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) surveyed behavioral, 
lesion, and electrophysiological evidence and concluded 
that there were two navigational mechanisms. One 
mechanism was based on the S-R approach just 
outlined, together with a guidance strategy based on 
responding to patterns of simulation in the environment, 
such as approaching or avoiding particular objects. In 
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these cases, learning reflected the action of associa-
tive processes, which they termed taxon learning. An 
important aspect of the characterization of taxon learn-
ing was that it depended on reinforcement (O’Keefe & 
Nadel, 1978, p. 100). In addition, the taxon system was 
not necessarily dependent on a metric representation of 
space, in that taxon strategies do not require an appre-
ciation of the distances and directions between cues in 
the environment to navigate effectively. A number of 
navigational strategies may be thought of as belong-
ing to this category, including the response learning 
just mentioned — which may be described as a route- 
following strategy — and others, such as view-match-
ing strategies in insects (e.g., M. Collett, Chittka, & 
Collett, 2013) and birds (e.g., Pritchard & Healy, 2017), 
and beaconing using visual landmarks (insects: Cheng, 
2012; pigeons: Cheng, Spetch, Kelly, & Bingman, 2006). 
The second system, O’Keefe and Nadel argued, was 
based on an isomorphic representation of allocentric 
space in the brain, which they termed locale   learning. 
This locale learning was the basis for a cognitive map, 
which allowed the animal to learn about places in the 
environment, their relation to other external cues, and the 
position of the animal itself. It could be said that such a 
map would provide the animal with a global representa-
tion of its familiar environment (Gallistel, 1990; Poucet, 
1993). This cognitive mapping was, they claimed, compu-
tationally efficient, domain specific, flexible, and robust, 
and was formed by exploration of the environment with-
out the requirement for reinforcement, in contrast to the 
conditions for taxon learning. In short, it was not the 
result of associative processes. The behavioral evidence 
for such a cognitive map came from studies demonstrat-
ing the inadequacy of S-R theory for explaining spatial 
behavior, such as the place and response learning dissoci-
ation by Tolman et al. (1946). However, the characteriza-
tion of associative learning as simply an S-R connection, 
wholly dependent on the co-occurrence of a reinforcer, 
does not reflect the richness of research into its charac-
teristics or properties. Indeed, O’Keefe and Nadel’s dual-
process account of spatial behavior was published at a 
time when other exciting developments in our understand-
ing of instrumental conditioning were being revealed. 
These theories of instrumental conditioning showed that 
associations between events included more than merely 
the connection between a stimulus representation and 
a response, and they largely confirmed the positions 
put forward as part of Tolman’s purposive behaviorism 
approach. As such, it is important to consider what they 
may tell us about the nature of spatial learning.
Is Spatial Learning Goal-Directed?
One of the key aims of Tolman’s program of work 
was to determine whether animals acted purposively. 
That is, do they have an expectation of the outcomes 
of their behavior? To that end, Tolman’s maze exper-
iments were designed to test if an animal could navi-
gate to a location regardless of the route it had taken to 
get there, as we have already seen. We may refer to this 
kind of association as R-O, in that it requires the asso-
ciation of an action (response) with the outcome. S-R 
learning has no capacity for such an association. For 
Tolman, the importance of learning was that it was goal-
directed. Although the behavior of animals in Tolman’s 
and others’ experiments (e.g., Elliot, 1929; Tinklepaugh, 
1928) seemed to indicate goal- directedness, S-R theo-
rists such as Hull (1943) were able to point to other 
factors, such as Pavlovian associations, that could 
account for the observed effects. Even spontaneous 
spatial alternation has been argued to be the result of 
simple non associative habituation mechanisms rather 
than the result of goal-directed action. Sanderson and 
Bannerman’s (2012) demonstration that deletion of the 
GluA1 subunit of the AMPA receptor impaired such 
spatial alternation, as well as short term but not long 
term habituation, led them to interpret alternation in 
terms of simple nonassociative processes. Only the 
development of inspired behavioral tests in the nonspa-
tial context of instrumental conditioning studies finally 
demonstrated goal-directed instrumental action (for 
reviews, see Dickinson, 1985; Dickinson & Balleine, 
1994). One of these tests is postconditioning outcome 
devaluation (e.g., Adams & Dickinson, 1981; Colwill & 
Rescorla, 1986). Typically in outcome devaluation, the 
value of the reinforcer is reduced by pairing it with an 
aversive event, such as illness, in the animal’s home cage, 
where there is no opportunity to make the instrumental 
response. The animal’s tendency to perform the instru-
mental response that had previously produced the now-
devalued outcome is then tested. Crucially, this test takes 
place in extinction, which prevents the animal from expe-
riencing the devalued outcome as a result of the instru-
mental response. Therefore, the devalued re inforcer has 
no opportunity to modify the strength of the S-R asso-
ciation directly, so we may conclude that any change in 
its behavior must be because of the animal’s expectation 
about the value of the reinforcer. Thus, in this proce-
dure it is not an animal’s spatial behavior that tells us 
about whether it expected the outcome but the sensitiv-
ity of a given response (R) to the expected value of the 
outcome (O) — that is, its goal-directedness.
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The question of interest is whether this associative 
analysis of goal-directedness can be extended to stud-
ies of spatial learning. Surprisingly few studies have 
examined this question using the successful method-
ology adopted to provide support for the dual-process 
(S-R and R-O) account of instrumental conditioning. 
S-R associations are said to form as a result of learn-
ing the instrumental contingencies between a response 
and a reinforcer, whereas R-O associations repre-
sent the causal relationship between an action and its 
consequences (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). The limi-
tations of a purely S-R account of learning are made 
clear when one considers that S-R learning precludes 
an animal from “knowing” about the consequences of 
its actions, which would prevent it from being able to 
decide between different actions based on its current 
motivational requirements. Recently, experiments from 
our own laboratory used the classic T-maze apparatus 
used by Tolman et al. (1946) to dissociate response and 
place spatial strategies. We applied the outcome devalu-
ation procedure to them to determine if they correspond 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the design used by Kosaki et al. (2018). Rats were trained on a dual-solution task in a T-maze (left panel). Immediately 
preceding the test trial, rats were given free access to either reinforcer pellets in the devaluation condition, or maintenance diet in the no devaluation 
condition (middle panel). The test trial was conducted in extinction. The rat was released from a novel start arm opposite that used during training. 
Two test trials were conducted, following prefeeding of either the reinforcer pellets or the maintenance diet, in a counterbalanced order (right panel).
to the dual-process account of instrumental condition-
ing just discussed (Kosaki, Pearce, & McGregor, 2018). 
In the first experiment, rats were trained to discriminate 
arms in the T-maze by finding a distinctively flavored 
food in one (see Figure 1). In their home cages, the rats 
were then fed either the food reward or their mainte-
nance diet to satiety. Thus, level of hunger was equated 
between the two conditions, but the value of the rein-
forcer experienced as part of the task in the T-maze was 
altered in only one. In two extinction test trials, one 
with the outcome devalued and one with no devalua-
tion, rats were released from the opposite location to 
that used during training. We could therefore dissoci-
ate place from response learning. Under nondevalued 
conditions, rats displayed no particular preference for 
the response or place strategy, but under outcome deval-
uation they switched to the response strategy by avoid-
ing the goal location. One issue with this finding was 
that rats might simply have reacted to the devaluation of 
the outcome using only the place strategy and that they 
did not rely on the response strategy during any part 
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of the probe trials. We could not conclude, therefore, 
that the response strategy was not sensitive to outcome 
devaluation. Therefore, in Experiment  2 we removed 
the opportunity to learn the place strategy by lesion-
ing the hippocampus, which impairs place learning but 
not response learning (Packard & McGaugh, 1996). 
The external environmental cues were also enhanced 
to encourage the sham-operated controls to rely more 
on the place strategy. As expected, the shams showed 
place learning and the hippocampal group showed 
response learning. Although both groups in both condi-
tions continued to follow the fixed response they learned 
during training, the outcome devaluation altered the 
sham group’s behavior by slowing their movement to the 
goal location but did not affect the hippocampal group’s 
behavior. The results are consistent with a correspon-
dence between the spatial literature dichotomy of place 
and response learning, and the instrumental condition-
ing literature of action (R-O) and habit (S-R); results 
show that in spatial learning, associative structures are 
not limited to S-R habits, as was assumed in O’Keefe 
and Nadel’s dual-process account. For similar results, 
albeit with slightly different procedures and controls, see 
also De Leonibus et al. (2011; mice), Sage and Knowlton 
(2000; rats), and Yin and Knowlton (2002, 2004; rats).
Latent Learning
An early argument about the nature of spatial 
learning was that it was not necessarily driven by rein-
forcement, in contrast to the prevailing view of the 
development of S-R associations. A literature quickly 
developed showing that spatial learning could occur in 
the absence of any obvious reinforcement. For example, 
Blodgett (1929) allowed three groups of rats to explore 
a maze of interconnected T-mazes, always placing the 
animals into the same part of the maze. For one group, 
a goal box contained food from the outset of the experi-
ment, and these animals learned quickly to run directly 
to the food, making few errors to reach it. The other 
two groups were not reinforced in this way, and they 
made many errors before they reached the same box that 
contained food for the first group. However, once food 
was introduced, at a different time point for each group, 
these animals ran almost immediately without error to 
the goal box. Such latent learning might be described as 
incidental and could certainly not be claimed to be the 
result of S-R learning. A central component of O’Keefe 
and Nadel’s (1978) theory was that cognitive maps were 
formed by exploration and that novelty, rather than 
reinforcement, was a key factor in spatial learning. The 
implication is that such mapping behavior cannot be 
explained by associative processes. However, we have 
already seen that S-R theory is an incomplete account 
of associative learning, and maze-running experiments 
such as Blodgett’s helped to show this. Modern asso-
ciative learning theory has long had to account for 
the formation of S-S associations in the absence of a 
re inforcer, exemplified by effects such as sensory precon-
ditioning (e.g., Rescorla & Cunningham, 1978; Rizley 
& Rescorla, 1972). Indeed, such sensory precondition-
ing effects have been reported in spatial learning tasks 
with pigeons (Blaisdell & Cook, 2005; Sawa, Leising, & 
Blaisdell, 2005), rats (Chamizo, Rodrigo, & Mackintosh, 
2006), and humans (Bouchekioua, Miller, Craddock, 
Blaisdell, & Molet, 2013; Molet, Jozefowiez, & Miller, 
2010; Prados, Alvarez, & Reynolds, 2011). For exam-
ple, Chamizo, Rodrigo, and Mackintosh (2006) trained 
rats to find a platform in a swimming pool using two 
sets of distal landmarks, experiencing each on differ-
ent occasions. For the experimental group, one of the 
landmarks in each set was common to both sets of land-
marks. When tested with a new configuration of land-
marks, excluding the common landmark, this group 
searched for the platform more accurately than a control 
group that had been trained without the common land-
mark. The results suggest that the rats integrated spatial 
information from different occasions without explicit 
reinforcement for doing so. These findings suggest that 
animals may be able to build up complex representa-
tions of space based on integrating simpler ones, in a 
manner consistent with the establishment of an associa-
tive chain. Of interest, a similar idea was hypothesized 
by Deutsch in 1960, who accounted for latent learning 
effects by theorizing that even without a goal present, 
animals could learn associations between stimuli close 
to one another in the maze. Once a reinforcer is intro-
duced, a goal representation is established, and in turn 
that activates the representations of stimuli connected to 
it. Because learning is expected to occur without explicit 
reinforcement in associative learning theory, its observa-
tion in spatial contexts can hardly be used as evidence of 
nonassociative processes. 
S-S Learning
The R-O association, discussed in the section on the 
goal-directedness of spatial learning above, may be seen 
as a specific form of S-S association in that it represents 
the association of one stimulus with another rather than 
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simply with a response. Is there evidence more widely of 
the formation of these S-S associations in spatial  learning? 
The existence of these kinds associations is crucial if we 
are to conclude that the flexible spatial behavior presented 
as evidence of locale learning by O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) 
is plausibly associative. It has been assumed by a number 
of “classic” early studies that spatial learning involves the 
representation of the goal. For example, Morris (1981) 
argued that the ability of rats to swim to a submerged 
platform in a swimming pool reflected the formation of a 
representation of the location of the platform with refer-
ence to landmarks outside the pool. The finding that rats 
seemingly swam directly to the platform location from 
a novel release point in the pool led Morris to conclude 
that navigation in the pool could not have been due to 
the formation of S-R associations. However, others have 
pointed out that it was impossible for Morris to prevent 
rats from encountering particular routes to the platform 
during training (e.g., Sutherland, Chew, Baker, & Ling-
gard, 1987). To overcome this criticism, Horne, Gilroy, 
Cuell, and Pearce (2012) prevented rats from developing 
S-R associations by placing them directly onto a platform 
in one corner of a rectangular swimming pool. Regard-
less of the delay between training and test, or the number 
of occasions on which they were placed onto the plat-
form, the rats showed a significant tendency to swim in 
the corners of the pool that were consistent with where the 
platform had been located during training, such as where 
a long wall was to the left of a short wall. One possibil-
ity was that this performance was the result of the forma-
tion of a cognitive map — a global representation of the 
environment (see also Cheng & Spetch, 1998; Gallistel, 
1990). However, in a final experiment, Horne et al. placed 
rats onto a platform in one corner of a rectangle during 
training before rearranging the walls to create a kite 
shape. The kite differed in its global shape from the rect-
angle but still shared local geometric features with the 
 rectangle — for example, a corner with a long side to the 
left of a short side was present in both shapes. Rats in 
this experiment still searched preferentially in the correct 
corner despite the change in overall shape. Horne et al. 
argued that such a result could only be the result of the 
formation of an S-S association during training and could 
not be due to S-R learning. They also argued that their 
results could not be explained by the development of a 
cognitive map during exposure to the arena, because the 
arena shapes during exposure and during test were differ-
ent (see also Pearce, Good, Jones, & McGregor, 2004, and 
the Relations Among Cues section). An important impli-
cation of this analysis is that associative learning does not 
have to be driven by reinforcement. A similar conclusion 
may be drawn from a rather different example — that of 
exploratory flights and walks in insects (T. S. Collett & 
Zeil, 2018).
Relations Among Cues
So far, this associative analysis has been limited to 
discussing how animals navigate to a goal location. Can 
the existence of S-S associations also be used to explain 
how animals learn the relationship between one cue and 
another, such as the position of one landmark in rela-
tion to another? For this to be achieved, there must be 
some kind of spatial or geometric representation of the 
relations among stimuli in the environment, and any 
associative account of spatial representation must be 
extended to include the capacity for metric relations 
to be represented. T. S. Collett, Cartwright, and Smith 
(1986) demonstrated gerbils’ ability to use the relation-
ship between one landmark and another when navigat-
ing to find a hidden sunflower seed. The seed was placed 
among black granite chippings so that it could not be 
detected until the animal was very close, and it always 
maintained the same relationship to the two landmarks, 
which were visually identical. The seed was placed south-
east of one of the landmarks and southwest of the other 
so that the three items formed the vertices of a notional 
isosceles triangle. The entire array was translated around 
the experimental room, and the gerbil’s start position 
was altered from one trial to the next so that there was 
no fixed route to the food. However, the array was not 
rotated between trials, so direction was determined, 
presumably, by cues present in the room. Test trials at the 
end of training with one of the two landmarks removed 
showed the animals searching equally to the southeast 
and southwest of the remaining landmark (see Figure 2). 
This pattern of results was interpreted as the result of 
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of training (left panel) and test (right panel) 
conditions in the study by Collett et al. (1986). The black circles indicate 
a landmark, and s indicates either the location of the seed (left panel) or 
search location (right panel).
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the gerbils having learned a vector from each landmark 
to the food, but without being able to determine which 
landmark was present, they searched at the ends of both 
vectors. One important inference of this finding is that 
when both landmarks were present, the position of one 
was able to provide some additional information that 
allowed the gerbil to calculate the directional component 
of the vector from the other landmark. 
Other studies have drawn similar conclusions — that 
vectors constitute a vital element of spatial behavior, 
allowing animals to learn the relations among  stimuli 
(e.g., Cheng, 1989, 1995, 2006; Gould-Beierle & Kamil, 
1996; Kamil & Jones, 2000; McGregor, Good, & Pearce, 
2004; Spetch, Cheng, & MacDonald, 1996). Such vector 
learning, using one landmark to determine the direction 
of a goal location from another, follows the same prin-
ciple of the S-S learning just outlined — that one stimu-
lus is associated with another to control  behavior — but 
crucially, the nature of the representation is undeniably 
spatial in that it represents metric information about 
distances and directions among and between stimuli. It 
may be that this vector learning, based on spatial relations 
among multiple landmarks, might allow the expression of 
complex spatial behavior (Biegler, McGregor, & Healy, 
1999; Kamil & Cheng, 2001). However,  Mackintosh (2002) 
argued that this does not necessarily constitute evidence 
for a cognitive map, as defined as a global representation 
of spatial relations in a familiar environment (Gallistel, 
1990; Poucet, 1993). 
One way of determining if such a global represen-
tation exists is to transform the global array of stim-
uli in the environment to establish if spatial search 
breaks down. Geometry learning is an example of 
spatial learning that some have claimed relies on a 
global representation of space. The importance of 
environmental geometry for determining direction 
(Cheng, 1986) and location (Doeller & Burgess, 2008) 
has been demonstrated in a wide variety of taxa (review 
in Cheng & Newcombe, 2005). Cheng’s (1986) seminal 
work involved training rats to find food in one corner 
of a rectangle — say, with the long side to the right of 
the short side — before removing them and rotating the 
arena. When returned to the rectangle, the rats tended to 
search in the same corner, and the diametrically oppo-
site one, evidently using the geometric cues to reorient 
themselves because the configuration of wall lengths 
was the same in these corners (e.g., corners A and C 
in Figure 3). The rats did this despite the presence of 
distinct visual/odor cues in each corner that could have 
disambiguated them. Cheng and Spetch (1998) specifi-
cally defined animals’ use of geometry as a configural 
representation of the broad shape of the environment, 
which did not involve the use of the elemental stimuli 
that made up the shape. Therefore, the representation of 
environmental geometry is a candidate for determining 
if animals encode the global layout of the environment. 
Arguably, an alternative interpretation for such results 
would be that the rats learned the local geometric rela-
tions of walls in different corners but did not necessarily 
stitch these together into a global representation. To test 
this possibility, Pearce et al. (2004) trained rats to locate 
a platform in a rectangular swimming pool much like 
that used by Horne et al. (2012) described earlier, with 
the exception that rats were released into the pool to 
Figure 3. The arenas used by Pearce et al. (2004) during training (left panel) and test (right panel). Corners A and C in the rectangle are geometrically 
equivalent to corner E in the kite. The principal axis is indicated in each shape as a dotted line.
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swim to the platform. At the end of training, the entire 
shape of the pool was transformed to that of a kite (see 
Figure 3), which contained the same elements and main-
tained some of the local geometric relations among the 
long and short walls (e.g., corners A and C) but which, 
crucially, was a different overall shape than the train-
ing environment. Despite this change in shape, the rats 
continued to discriminate the correct (e.g., E) from the 
incorrect right-angled corner (e.g., F). Although the use 
of a maplike representation seemed to be ruled out by 
these results, Cheng and Gallistel (2005) pointed out that 
the locations of the correct right-angle corners in both 
the rectangle and the kite could be defined with respect 
to other global shape parameters, such as the principal 
axis or medial axes of the shapes. In the case of the rect-
angle and kite shown in Figure 3, the dashed line on each 
shape shows the principal axis.
The hypothesis that rats might be using the princi-
pal axis to generalize across environments was tested by 
McGregor, Jones, Good, and Pearce (2006). The authors 
trained rats to swim to a platform in an irregular penta-
gon as shown in Figure  4. The platform was always 
located in the same right-angled corner (corner S or R, 
depending on counterbalancing) during this training. If 
rats were using the principal axis, shown as a dashed 
line, to locate the correct corner, then when tested in a 
transformed rectangular arena, the rats should transfer 
their search accordingly. Specifically, a rat trained to find 
the platform in corner S of the pentagon should search 
in corners V and X of the rectangle. This prediction is 
the direct opposite of the local geometry account, which 
supposes that rats would search in corners W and Y. The 
results supported the local geometry account. However, 
it is possible that animals are capable of forming both 
global and local representations of the shape of the envi-
ronment and that altering the overall shape forces the 
animal to employ only the local representation. Kelly, 
Chiandetti, and Vallortigara (2011) found some support 
for the medial axes account of Cheng and Gallistel 
(2005) using pigeons and chicks in another transforma-
tion experiment. They trained their birds to find food in 
one corner of a rectangle before testing in a L-shaped 
arena (see Figure 5). The local geometry account would 
predict that animals trained in corner A of the rectangle 
would search in corners K and N in the L-shape, which 
is what both pigeons and chicks did. However, they also 
searched in corner O, which would be predicted by the 
medial axis account. Pigeons searched there more than 
chicks, which led the authors to the conclusion that 
pigeons relied primarily on medial axes, whereas chicks 
primarily used local geometry followed by medial axes. 
There is also evidence that humans are able to use the 
principal axis (Ambosta, Reichert, & Kelly, 2013; Bodily, 
Eastman, & Sturz, 2011) and that they have both local 
and global representations available to them (Buckley, 
Smith, & Haselgrove, 2016; Lew et al., 2014). Of interest, 
Figure 4. The arenas used by McGregor et al. (2006) during training and test. The principal axis of each shape is denoted with a dotted line.  
Corner S in the pentagon is geometrically equivalent to corners Y and W in the rectangle.
171contents and conditions of spatial learning
VOLUME 15, 2020
however, recent research questions the evidence for both 
the local geometry account and the principal/medial axes 
accounts. Sotelo, Nardi, et al. (2019) with pigeons, and 
Sotelo, Alcalá, Bingman, and Muzio (2019) with a terres-
trial toad, employed a similar transformation design as 
Pearce et al. (2004) and failed to find any evidence that 
either species was able to transfer their search from a 
rectangle to a kite. The results are difficult to explain 
without assuming that during training in the rectangle, 
the pigeons and toads had formed the kind of global 
geometric representation assumed by Cheng and Spetch 
(1998) to underlie Cheng’s (1986) findings.
The possibility that (some) animals are able to form 
such global representations may be said to give support 
to the notion of a cognitive map. Definitions of cognitive 
maps vary (e.g., Gallistel, 1990; Leonard & McNaugh-
ton, 1990; O’Keefe & Nadel, 1978), and some have argued 
that the concept of a cognitive map is flawed for this 
very reason (e.g., Bennett, 1996). However, it is generally 
recognized that they should allow the animal to repre-
sent the interrelations among objects and surfaces in 
its environment and that the animal should be in some 
sense independent of the representation, so that its own 
position within the map can be represented. The original 
formulation of the hippocampus-based cognitive map by 
O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) supposed an isomorphic repre-
sentation of environmental space in the hippo campus by 
place cells, which respond to a rat’s position in space 
regardless of its route and the direction it is facing. 
Discoveries of other cells have followed, including head 
direction cells, which respond when the animal faces a 
particular direction but which are invariant to its posi-
tion (e.g., Taube, Muller, & Ranck, 1990), and grid cells 
in the entorhinal cortex (e.g., Hafting, Fyhn, Molden, 
Moser, & Moser, 2005), which have been proposed to 
provide a metric input of distance and direction infor-
mation to the place cells in the hippocampus. Not all 
neuroscientists agree that the existence of such cells 
compels us to accept the existence of a cognitive map, 
however (e.g., Leonard & McNaughton, 1990), because 
nonmapping accounts of their function are viable. In 
addition, because the function of the different cells is 
under very active research, an agreed account of their 
function is not yet available. For example, although the 
preceding global representation account may fit best 
with the hypothesis put forward by O’Keefe and Nadel 
(1978), recent evidence from O’Keefe’s laboratory fits 
better with the local geometry hypothesis put forward 
by Pearce  et al.  (2004; see Krupic, Bauza, Burton, & 
O’Keefe, 2018). In addition, some of the most compelling 
evidence for the existence of a cognitive map comes from 
the invertebrate literature (e.g., Cheeseman et al., 2014), 
in animals that do not possess the rodent’s neural archi-
tecture. Even this evidence, however, is open to crit-
icism that design flaws preclude the conclusion that 
animals possess cognitive maps. For example, both 
Figure 5. The arenas used by Kelly et al. (2011) during training (left panel) and test (right panel). The medial axes of each arena are shown as dotted lines.
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in the field and the laboratory it is extremely difficult 
to ensure that the goal location is not visible from a 
supposed novel start point (e.g., Gould, 1986; see Dyer, 
1991), or to ensure that a novel route was not actually 
experienced during training (Morris, 1981; see Suther-
land et al., 1987), making it difficult to infer that animals 
are able to navigate using a cognitive map (for review, 
see Pritchard & Healy, 2017). A final point to make here 
is that apparent shortcutting behavior, another behavior 
predicted by cognitive map theory, might be explained 
by animals forming an associative chain while navigat-
ing a fixed route, based on S-S associations. According 
to Deutsch’s (1960) theory, because the stimuli along a 
route are experienced in a fixed temporal order, each 
set of stimuli becomes associated with the next, and the 
final set of stimuli becomes associated with the goal. As 
the animal passes by each set of stimuli, the representa-
tion of the next is activated. If an opportunity to make a 
shortcut arises, then the animal will take it, not because 
it has a global representation of the relations among all 
of the stimuli in the environment but because the repre-
sentation of a set of stimuli closer to the goal has been 
activated. Deutsch’s theory actually incorporated many 
of Tolman’s (1948) concepts and is able to account for 
a great deal of the spatial flexibility that O’Keefe and 
Nadel (1978) argued was key evidence for the existence 
of a global cognitive map. Yet O’Keefe and Nadel did 
not consider Deutsch’s theory in their work (Dickin-
son, 1980). Despite this, a flaw in Deutsch’s theory is 
that it is essentially nonspatial. We have seen compelling 
evidence that animals do represent distances and direc-
tions among cues in their environments, and an associa-
tive account of what is learned in spatial learning must 
incorporate this. It may be that the most complex and 
abstract kinds of spatial representation are beyond what 
associative learning theory can currently accommodate, 
but the evidence for such representations is certainly not 
always consistent, as we have seen. In the second part of 
the article, I turn to the conditions of learning.
Discrimination of Stimuli
An early account of a major difference between 
spatial learning and associative learning was that the 
former was incidental, whereas the latter depended on 
reinforcement. We have seen that this is a rather outdated 
distinction, to the point that it may be called a fallacy. 
It does seem to be the case, however, that exploration is 
a necessary condition for spatial learning, so it is worth 
considering what associative processes might be at play 
while an animal explores its environment (see, e.g., 
Ellen, Soteres, & Wages, 1984;  Sutherland et al., 1987). 
One reason that exploration might be important is that 
it increases the exposure to stimuli in the environment, 
which in turn may modulate their discriminability via 
a process of perceptual learning. A well-known conse-
quence of exposure to a stimulus without a resulting 
biologically relevant event, such as food, is known as 
latent inhibition — a retardation of subsequent learn-
ing when the stimulus does indicate an important event 
(Lubow, 1973; Lubow & Weiner, 2010). However, expo-
sure to more than one stimulus is sometimes found to 
actually facilitate subsequent discrimination between 
them (E. J. Gibson & Walk, 1956; Hall, 1991; McLaren 
& Mackintosh, 2000). McLaren and Mackintosh (2000) 
proposed several associative mechanisms that could 
lead to perceptual learning, including latent inhibi-
tion of common elements, and mutual inhibition of 
unique elements. Their account predicted that expo-
sure to stimuli would facilitate subsequent discrimina-
tion most when the stimuli were more similar to each 
other but that latent inhibition would be more evident 
when there was a greater perceptual difference between 
stimuli. Such a prediction has been borne out in studies 
of spatial learning (e.g., Chamizo & Mackintosh, 1989; 
 Trobalon, Chamizo, & Mackintosh, 1992).  Trobalon, 
Sansa, Chamizo, and Mackintosh (1991) preexposed 
two groups of rats to two different arms in a radial arm 
maze. For one group the arms were separated by 135°, so 
the views of the room cues from the ends of these arms 
were very different. For the other group the arms were 
separated by only 45°, meaning that the views from the 
arms were rather similar and the discrimination there-
fore more difficult. Compared with a control group 
that did not receive preexposure, the preexposed group 
with the easy discrimination failed to show any effects 
of perceptual learning once one of the arms was baited 
with food, but the group with the difficult discrimina-
tion did, with the rats subsequently learning to run to 
the baited arm with fewer errors than the control group.
Conversely, Rodrigo, Chamizo, McLaren, and 
Mackintosh (1994) showed that preexposure to land-
mark cues surrounding a radial arm maze enhanced 
subsequent discrimination of the arms in a learning task 
if the exposed views were common to the various arms. 
However, if the exposed views were unique to the correct 
and incorrect arms in the later discrimination task, the 
acquisition was impaired, consistent with a latent inhi-
bition effect. This retardation of learning in the spatial 
domain is an outcome that O’Keefe and Nadel’s (1978) 
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cognitive mapping theory cannot predict, because explo-
ration of an environment in that account is expected to 
lead to the buildup of a cognitive map. That is, accord-
ing to a cognitive map account, the preexposure to the 
environment should only facilitate later discrimination.
Changes in Attention
The effects of exploration of stimuli not only are 
evident from studies of perceptual learning but also 
may be observed by subsequent changes of attention 
to different cues in the environment. Several authors 
have proposed that the attention paid to a stimulus 
increases if it reliably predicts a significant outcome 
and that the stimulus is subsequently more likely to 
enter into a new association if the opportunity arises 
(e.g., George & Pearce, 1999; Le Pelley, 2004; Mack-
intosh, 1975; Mackintosh & Sutherland, 1971). Testing 
this account is an extremely active and fruitful area 
of research in associative learning and has been very 
influential in how we consider humans to learn (e.g., Le 
Pelley,  Mitchell,  Beesley, George, & Wills, 2016), but few 
studies have examined this idea in spatial learning. One 
study using the water maze has shown results consis-
tent with the idea that prior experience with a cue influ-
ences its future associability. Prados, Redhead, and 
Pearce (1999) trained rats to swim to a submerged plat-
form that had a stick attached to it. In addition, four 
landmarks were positioned around the periphery of the 
pool, inside a curtain that blocked from view the rest of 
the testing room. At the end of training, test trials were 
conducted in which the stick was removed from the plat-
form but the landmarks remained present. For Group 
Stable-Same, and Group Stable-Diff, the positions of 
the landmarks remained in the same positions through-
out training, meaning that they were, in addition to the 
stick, reliable indicators of the position of the platform. 
Another group — Group Mix — was trained in a similar 
way to the other two groups, but between every trial the 
configuration of landmarks was changed, so they did 
not provide reliable information about where the plat-
form was located. During the test trials, the landmarks 
were in the same configuration as during training for 
Group Stable-Same but were in a new configuration for 
Group Stable-Diff. Despite this, both groups located the 
platform in a similar time to each other, and consider-
ably faster than Group Mix. The results are consistent 
with the notion that during training for Group Stable-
Diff, attention paid to the landmarks increased so that 
they were readily able to enter into a new association 
with the platform position after their configuration was 
altered during the test. The results cannot be explained 
by the idea put forward in the previous section — that 
discriminability of the landmarks increased as a result 
of their exposure — because the same effect should have 
been observed for Group Mix. They are also difficult 
to account for by appealing to successful navigation 
depending on the formation of a cognitive map.
Further evidence for the role that attention plays 
in spatial learning comes from demonstrations of 
intradimensional extradimensional shift effects that 
are considered a hallmark of the associative learn-
ing theories involving changes to attention (e.g., Buck-
ley, Smith, & Haselgrove, 2014; Cuell, Good, Dopson, 
Pearce, & Horne, 2012; Trobalon, Miguelez, McLaren, 
&  Mackintosh, 2003). 
Cue Competition
One of the phenomena most closely connected with 
associative learning is cue competition. Cue competition 
may be defined as occurring when behavioral control 
from one stimulus is restricted by prior or concurrent 
learning to another; it is significant in relation to spatial 
learning because so many sources of spatial informa-
tion are available to animals that some have argued that 
learning based on this redundancy must involve indepen-
dent modules (e.g., Cheng, 1986; Gallistel, 1990; Jeffery, 
2010). Although the development of new modules over 
the modification of old ones makes sense from an evolu-
tionary perspective (Shettleworth, 2010), the question 
of how such modules control the progression of spatial 
learning remains open. One characteristic of modular-
ity is that modules are said to be encapsulated (Fodor, 
1983); that is, information processed within a module is 
impenetrable to information stored outside the module. 
If this is the case with spatial processing modules, then 
cue competition should not be expected within spatial 
learning. It is difficult to say whether different spatial 
strategies, such as using magnetic cues, sun compass, 
path integration, olfaction, or landmarks, are processed 
in competition with one another, as predicted by an 
associative account, or if they are processed in parallel, 
or even hierarchically. Shettleworth (2010) argued that 
parallel processing would make sense, as different strate-
gies can act as backups for one another when other strat-
egies are unavailable. In reference to the preceding list 
of strategies, pigeons might make use of olfactory cues 
when the sun compass is unavailable (Keeton, 1974). 
The evidence to date points also to parallel processing 
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of path integration (when animals maintain a vector 
between their current location and a home base) and 
learning based on landmarks (Shettleworth & Sutton, 
2005), and there is little evidence that response and place 
learning strategies are in competition with one another 
(B. M. Gibson & Shettleworth, 2005). Cheng, Shettle-
worth, Huttenlocher, and Rieser (2007) suggested that 
in cases such as these, one strategy is necessary for the 
development of learning based on the other. However, 
evidence from ant and bee navigation suggests that inde-
pendent modules for path integration, orientation from 
surrounding panoramic views, and systematic search 
strategies, previously thought to act in sequence, are 
actually integrated to form optimal hierarchical navi-
gational strategies (Hoinville & Wehner, 2018; Wehner, 
Hoinville, Cruse, & Cheng, 2016).
In some circumstances, however, it is possible to 
assess cue competition. In particular, one influen-
tial theory of navigation by O’Keefe and Nadel (1978) 
argues that the formation of a cognitive map occurs 
incidentally, driven by exploration of the environment, 
rather than by associative rules. The addition of new 
information to the cognitive map should occur regard-
less of experience with other cues within the map. Thus, 
the presence or otherwise of cue competition in spatial 
learning tasks that are said to engage a cognitive map 
is fundamental to our understanding of whether spatial 
learning is under the control of associative processes.
A number of excellent reviews have documented 
evidence for cue competition effects in spatial learning 
(e.g., Chamizo, 2003; Pearce, 2009; Shettleworth, 2010). 
Blocking, in which prior learning restricts learning about 
a newly introduced cue, and overshadowing, in which 
concurrent learning about two or more cues results 
in restricted learning about each, have been demon-
strated both between proximal landmarks (e.g., Rodrigo, 
Chamizo, McLaren, & Mackintosh, 1997; Sanchez-
Moreno, Rodrigo, Chamizo, & Mackintosh, 1999; 
Sansa & Prados, 2003) and between proximal and distal 
landmarks (e.g., Diez-Chamizo, Sterio, & Mackintosh, 
1985; March, Chamizo, & Mackintosh, 1992; Roberts & 
Pearce, 1998). In the case of Roberts and Pearce (1998), 
learning the position of a platform in a water maze with 
reference to distal room cues was considerably weakened 
if rats had prior experience of finding the platform with 
a beacon attached before the room cues were revealed. 
This result is particularly surprising, as learning based 
on the room cues has been argued to engage a cognitive 
map, whereas navigating with reference to a beacon does 
not (Morris, 1981; Morris, Garrud, Rawlins, & O’Keefe, 
1982). It raises a question over the use of the cognitive 
map hypothesis as a distinct psychological representa-
tion from those governed by associative processes.
A notable case, in which cue competition was at 
first difficult to demonstrate, was the geometric module 
hypothesis. Cheng (1986) proposed that animals 
displayed a primacy for extracting the broad geometric 
layout of the environment when they were first required 
to orient within it. Furthermore, they did this despite 
the presence of nongeometric features that, under some 
conditions, could provide more reliable information 
for orientation. Studies followed demonstrating this 
effect from fish to human infants (reviewed in Cheng & 
Newcombe, 2005). From the notion of an encapsulated 
geometric module follows the prediction that the repre-
sentation of environmental geometry will be unaffected 
by prior or concurrent training based on nongeomet-
ric features, such as wall color or discrete landmarks. 
Certain studies in rats reported a failure to demon-
strate either blocking or overshadowing of geometry 
by featural cues (e.g., Hayward, Good, & Pearce, 2004; 
Hayward, McGregor, Good, & Pearce, 2003; McGregor, 
Horne, Esber, & Pearce, 2009; Pearce, Ward-Robin-
son, Good, Fussell, & Aydin, 2001; Wall, Botly, Black, 
& Shettleworth, 2004). However, first in black-capped 
chickadees (Gray, Bloomfield, Ferrey, Spetch, & Sturdy, 
2005), then in rats (Pearce, Graham, Good, Jones, & 
McGregor, 2006), it was shown that wall color restricted 
learning based on geometry. Subsequently, the same cue 
competition effects were shown for discrete landmarks 
restricting learning based on geometry (e.g., rats: Horne 
& Pearce, 2009; Kosaki, Austen, & McGregor, 2013; 
humans: Wilson & Alexander, 2008) and for cue compe-
tition between entirely geometric cues (e.g., humans: 
Prados, 2011; Redhead & Hamilton, 2009).
An examination of the peculiar difficulties in 
demonstrating cue competition with geometric cues 
reveals the importance of the relative salience of geomet-
ric and nongeometric cues. One strand of this evidence 
comes from studies in which male and female rats were 
compared in the extent to which they relied on geomet-
ric and nongeometric information. Pioneering work by 
Williams, Barnett, and Meck (1990) and Williams and 
Meck (1991) established that female rats have a clear 
tendency to use landmarks, such as objects around a 
room or posters on walls, when solving spatial tasks, 
whereas male rats tend to use geometric cues, such as 
the shape of the testing room. This finding was repli-
cated in a swimming pool by Rodríguez, Torres, Mack-
intosh, and Chamizo (2010), who argued that these 
175contents and conditions of spatial learning
VOLUME 15, 2020
differences reflected differences in cue salience to males 
and females. Rodríguez, Chamizo, and Mackintosh 
(2011) then showed that these differences in salience 
made a striking difference in the extent to which land-
marks could block or overshadow geometry, finding 
that learning based on geometry seemed impervious to 
learning based on a landmark for male rats but that for 
female rats the opposite was true, consistent with the 
differential salience of these cues for the two sexes. The 
other strand of evidence comes from studies in which 
the salience of landmark or geometry cues was manipu-
lated by the experimenter rather than by evolution. Both 
the salience of the geometric cue (Kosaki et al., 2013) 
and the landmark cue (Austen, Kosaki, & McGregor, 
2013; Chamizo, Rodrigo, Peris, & Grau, 2006; Horne & 
Pearce, 2011) determine the extent to which cue compe-
tition is observed.
Under some circumstances this cue salience effect 
has led to the surprising facilitation of geometry learn-
ing by the simultaneous presence of a landmark (Cole, 
Gibson, Pollack, & Yates, 2011; Horne & Pearce, 
2011: rats) or feature (Kelly, 2010: Clark’s nutcrackers; 
Pearce et al., 2006: rats). This effect, too, seems to be 
related to the relative salience of landmarks/features and 
geometry cues. Horne and Pearce (2011) showed that 
when the landmark cue is particularly salient compared 
with geometry, overshadowing is observed. When it is 
of relatively weak salience compared with geometry, 
geometry learning is enhanced. The effect seems to be 
modulated by the presence of within-compound asso-
ciations that form between the landmark and geometry 
cues, with the relative expression of these associations, 
alongside direct associations between the geometry and 
the platform and the landmark and the platform, deter-
mining the effect observed. This analysis was given 
support by the results of an experiment reported by 
Austen et al. (2013; see Figure 6). They trained rats to 
find a platform in one corner of a triangular pool. In 
addition to the geometric cues provided by the shape of 
the pool, the rats could discriminate the corners based 
Figure 6. Schematic diagram of the design used by Austen et al. (2013). Rats were trained to find the platform in one corner of the triangle (indicated 
by a +) and could use the landmarks to distinguish the corners as well as the unique geometric properties of the walls in each corner (left panel). In the 
landmark stage, for one group the contingency between the platform and the landmarks was reversed (reversal treatment), and it was maintained for 
the other (middle panel). During tests, in extinction and with no landmarks present, the ability of each of the groups to discriminate the geometric cues 
was evaluated. Despite both groups experiencing the same contingencies between geometry and reinforcement, the reversal group discriminated 
significantly less well than the no reversal group. 
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on the features of the landmark that occupied that 
corner. Later, reversing the contingency between the 
landmarks and the platform in a circular pool corre-
spondingly diminished discrimination based on geom-
etry when the rats were finally tested in the triangular 
pool. The results indicate that the sight of the geometric 
cues associated with the platform also evoked a repre-
sentation of the landmark that was previously associated 
with those geometric cues. For those rats that underwent 
reversal training, the discrimination of geometry was 
weakened by the revalued within-compound association.
The results from these studies of cue competi-
tion in both landmark learning cognitive map tasks 
(e.g., Morris, 1981) and geometry learning tasks (e.g., 
Cheng, 1986) have failed to support the hypothesis that 
spatial learning progresses by some nonassociative rule. 
Instead, the failure to demonstrate cue competition can 
be explained by differences in the relative salience of 
cues (Kosaki et al., 2013; Rodríguez et al., 2011), or the 
compensatory effects of within-compound associations 
(Austen et al., 2013; Horne & Pearce, 2011), which are 
effects all explained by principles of associative learning. 
Challenges and Priorities
The effects discussed in this article may be general 
across species, but it is not possible to claim this with a 
great deal of certainty. The reviewed literature does not 
cover a great variety of taxa, and the field must address 
this problem. Even in relation to the (mostly rodent) 
species discussed, most of the work has been conducted 
with only one sex — the male. A number of authors have 
discussed the importance of considering sex differ-
ences in cognition and neuroscience (e.g., Cahill, 2006; 
Kimura, 2000), so the field must address this problem in 
the future. In relation to testing a wider range of taxa, 
one problem might be the friction between internal and 
external validity. Psychologists concerned with associa-
tive learning theory have tended to confine their inter-
est to a few well-studied species in a few well-understood 
paradigms. To a large extent this suits their objective 
of conducting extremely well-controlled experiments. 
However, it also limits the generality of their conclu-
sions, so an attempt to conduct the kinds of experiments 
discussed in this article with a wider range of species is 
a challenge to the field.
Equally, although the conditions under which spatial 
learning progresses is well studied and characterized, and 
the nature of the associations formed in spatial learn-
ing, are reasonably well understood (albeit with some 
questions over the evidence for the most complex metric 
representations), this article has had little to say about 
how learning is translated into performance. Certain 
mechanisms have been proposed in simpler models for 
how animals minimize the discrepancy between the 
animal’s current view and one held in memory. For 
example, a view-matching mechanism first proposed in 
bees (Cartwright & Collett, 1983) has been used with 
some success to explain various behavioral results in 
rats navigating in geometrically distinct environments 
(Cheung, Stürzl, Zeil, & Cheng, 2008; Stürzl, Cheung, 
Cheng, & Zeil, 2008). Although such accounts may be 
able to model accurate navigation in these environ-
ments, they are unable to explain all of the reports of 
cue competition and facilitation just discussed. They are, 
essentially, taxon learning models, as are a number of 
“ servomechanism” models (reviewed in Cheng, 2006) that 
provide a set of algorithms to translate learning to motor 
output. However, models that have attempted to explain 
the output of the neurons thought to underlie cognitive 
mapping (Poulter et al., 2018) have not always produced 
truly maplike results either. For example, Brown and 
Sharp (1995) proposed an S-R mechanism that depended 
on hypothetical roles for place cells and head direction 
cells but that limited the animal to a fixed path. More 
flexible is the model by Burgess, Recce, and O’Keefe 
(1994), which couples the activity of place cells to hippo-
campal theta rhythm. As the animal explores its environ-
ment, the firing of place cells in the animal’s path is linked 
to the activity of hypothetical goal cells. The output of 
these goal cells enables to animal to estimate the distance 
and direction to the goal from anywhere along the path. 
Although this model provides a more flexible mechanism 
than Brown and Sharp’s (1995), it relies on the action of 
neural units that have not yet been shown to exist. To 
better account for the associative effects previously 
discussed, Miller and Shettleworth (2007) proposed tying 
a performance rule to an associative learning rule. The 
tendency to navigate to a location was directly related 
to the strength of an association between a cue and an 
outcome, and the model was able to account for many of 
the associative effects described earlier in this article. But 
the predictions of the circumstances under which these 
effects should occur have not always been supported 
by experimental evidence (Austen et al., 2013; Horne & 
Pearce 2011; McGregor et al., 2009). Clearly an account 
is required that can incorporate the output of learning to 
performance but also incorporates our knowledge about 
the neural basis of spatial behavior and the associative 
phenomena that demonstrate how learning progresses.
177contents and conditions of spatial learning
VOLUME 15, 2020
Before this is possible, however, a serious attempt 
must be made to better understand the link between the 
neural and psychological bases of spatial learning. At 
present, these literatures seem largely to progress inde-
pendent of one another, as though evidence from one has 
no bearing on research in the other. Although under-
standing the neural basis of instrumental and Pavlovian 
conditioning seems to be a healthy and active pursuit 
(Johansson, Jirenhed, Rasmussen, Zucca, & Hesslow, 
2014; Lingawi, Dezfouli, & Balleine, 2016), this seems 
to be less of a priority in spatial learning. However, a 
complete account will not be possible until we can under-
stand the neural basis of psychological effects and explain 
the psychological effects in terms of neural activity.
Conclusions
Perhaps associative learning theory has suffered 
from a deep misunderstanding in the wider psychological 
community. This misunderstanding is based on a view 
that associative learning is synonymous with the views 
of early behaviorists and with S-R theory. However, as 
we have seen, modern associative learning has long had 
to account for goal-directedness, and a specific branch 
of study has concerned itself with developing behavioral 
assays to record goal-directed action. I have argued that 
these same assays may be applied to spatial learning 
and that they reveal the same distinction between habit-
like behaviors and goal-directedness. Another way of 
conceptualizing this goal-directedness is as  stimulus–
stimulus associations, and I have demonstrated the 
existence of these S-S associations between cues in the 
spatial environment as well as between a stimulus and 
an outcome. In particular, learning vectors among land-
marks in the environment provides a particularly rich 
representation of the relations among stimuli, though I 
have argued that this does not necessarily compel us to 
accept that animals possess cognitive maps. To exam-
ine the notion of cognitive maps further, I examined the 
claim that cognitive maps are acquired via a distinctive 
nonassociative mechanism. This mechanism has been 
said to be based on active exploration of the environ-
ment and is incidental in nature. Although the impor-
tance of exploration is not in doubt, I argued that its 
importance was not necessarily because it engaged a 
nonassociative mechanism, as S-R theory had already 
been demonstrated as an inadequate representation of 
associative learning theory. Instead, I demonstrated that 
distinctively associative phenomena such as latent inhi-
bition, perceptual learning, and changes in attention 
could explain why exploration is an important condi-
tion for spatial learning. Finally, I examined the claim 
that spatial learning is an example of cognitive modu-
larity by testing whether it is immune to cue competi-
tion effects. We saw that spatial learning conforms to 
the expectation of associative learning theories, being 
subject to the same domain-general competitive algo-
rithms as demonstrated in nonspatial associative tasks. 
Although this review is necessarily limited in its scope, it 
provides an associationist’s view of many of the phenom-
ena that have been claimed to be unique to spatial learn-
ing and shows a formal correspondence between spatial 
and nonspatial learning. 
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